Corporate Takeover Defenses after \u3ci\u3eQVC\u3c/i\u3e: Can Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender Offers Without Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties by Kurp, Melissa M.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 26
Issue 1 Fall 1994 Article 3
1994
Corporate Takeover Defenses afterQVC: Can
Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender Offers
Without Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties
Melissa M. Kurp
Assoc. Shefsky & Froelich, Ltd., Chicago IL.
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melissa M. Kurp, Corporate Takeover Defenses after QVC: Can Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender Offers Without Breaching Their
Fiduciary Duties, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 29 (1994).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol26/iss1/3
Corporate Takeover Defenses After QVC: Can
Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender Offers
Without Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties?
By Melissa M. Kurp*
The 1980s became the decade of the corporate takeover.' Until re-
cently, takeover activity in the 1990s has paled in comparison for
various reasons, including the recent recession, increased equity
prices, and continued reluctance of traditional lenders to finance
acquisitions.2 Media coverage of the QVC and Viacom contest for
control of Paramount has focused the public's attention once again on
the corporate takeover.
Along with the renewed interest in corporate acquisitions is a re-
minder that many takeover-related issues brought to the forefront of
corporate jurisprudence in the 1980s remain unresolved. One of the
most important of these unsettled issues is the validity of takeover
defenses.3 In a corporate climate where shareholders demand that
directors of corporations justify their every action,4 an issue of great
concern to corporate directors is their ability to fend off hostile tender
offers without breaching any fiduciary duties to the corporation or
shareholders. Before analyzing takeover defenses and corporate
directors' ability to use them, this Article first will explore the basics of
corporate takeovers.
* The author graduated from Loyola University Chicago School of Law in May 1994.
She currently works as an associate at Shefsky & Froelich, Ltd. of Chicago, Illinois.
The author extends her gratitude to Professor Charles Murdock of Loyola University
Chicago School of Law for providing her with the idea and opportunity to write this
article.
1. See Joseph Kershenbaum, Note, Corporate Law-A Snapshot of the Takeover
Decade: Polaroid Corp. v. Disney-Whether a Target Corporation has Third Party
Standing to Assert a Violation of the All-Holders Rule, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 63, 63
n.2 (1991); Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Directors' Fiduciary
Duties in the Context of Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 811, 812 n.7 (1990);
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURrITES LAW § 4.01 (1990).
2. John M. Olson, The Fiduciary Duties of Insurgent Boards, 47 Bus. LAW. 1011,
1011 (1992).
3. Robert A. Ragazzo, The Legitimacy of the Takeover Defense in the '90s, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 689, 690 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Carol Hymnowitz, More Employees, Shareholders Demand That
Sacrifices in Pay Begin At the Top, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1990, at BI; Alexandra Peers,
Inside Track, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1991, at Cl.
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I. THE BASICS OF CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
A corporate takeover involves a change of corporate control, usually
prompted when an acquirer' makes a tender offer6 to the shareholders
of a target corporation.7 In the wake of the first wave of corporate
takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act8 in 1968 to supplement
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and to
regulate corporate takeovers in the national markets. The main
objective of the Williams Act is to protect investors in target corpo-
rations.'0 To protect target shareholders, the Williams Act regulates
tender offers by requiring full disclosure of tender offers and estab-
lishing procedural rules governing tender offers." The Williams Act
also contains an antifraud provision directed at both the acquirer and
the target board to prevent influencing the decision of investors or the
outcome of the tender offer.
12
In a takeover contest, the acquirer's weapon is the attractiveness of
the offer. By contrast, the target board is equipped with a full arsenal
of weapons to fend off the acquirer. Collectively, the arsenal of the
target board is commonly referred to as "takeover defenses. 13 Target
boards may implement a variety of takeover defenses, including: (1)
effecting stock repurchases; (2) engaging white knights; (3) incor-
porating no-shop provisions in agreements with a friendly acquirer; (4)
accelerating loans; (5) providing for golden parachutes; (6) selling
crown jewels; (7) creating employee stock option plans ("ESOPs"); (8)
5. Often, more than one acquirer is involved in a contest for corporate control.
6. A tender offer occurs when a person or group offers to purchase from stockholders
of a target corporation their stock in that corporation. 13A BYRON E. Fox & ELAENOR M.
Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS § 27.01 (1992).
Tender offers can be either friendly or unfriendly. A friendly offer involves a change of
control between parties who want to effect a sale to the benefit of both parties; an
unfriendly offer typically involves a contest for corporate control between the acquirer
and target management. Id.
7. Throughout this Article, a corporation, including its directors, management and
shareholders, which is the subject of a tender offer will be referred to as the target
corporation, target board or target stockholders. The person or group that is making the
offer to the target shareholders will be referred to as the acquirer(s) or the acquiring
corporation.
8. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78n (1988)).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f) (1988).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
13. See infra part IV for examples and detailed explanation of takeover defenses and
how they are implemented.
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instituting defensive lawsuits; and (9) implementing poison pill rights
plans. 4 Generally, target boards are driven to implement defensive
tactics in order to: (1) protect shareholders and (2) maintain control
over the corporation. Because these two goals are often conflicting,
directors are rightfully wary of possibly breaching their fiduciary duty
to the corporation and its shareholders.
To test the legality of target boards' use of takeover defenses, courts
generally use an "enhanced" business judgment rule.". The traditional
business judgment rule provides that, in the absence of bad faith or
self-dealing, a court will not interfere with the judgment of a board of
directors. 6 Because the threat of a takeover bid may give rise to a
conflict-of-interest situation, 7 courts have shifted the burden under the
traditional business judgment rule from the plaintiff, usually either the
acquirer and/or the target shareholders, to the target board, creating an
enhanced business judgment rule, otherwise known as the Unocal
standard.' 8 Depending upon the circumstances, however, a court's
application of the enhanced business judgment rule may .only mirror
the traditional business judgment rule.' 9
14. For an explanation of each defense see infra part IV.B.
15. See infra part II.A. The traditional business judgment rule shields directors from
liability for their conduct in the daily management of the corporation. Responsibilities
of Corporate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
No. 1438, 707 (Mar. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Responsibilities of Corporate Officers].
Because the business judgment rule is a function of corporate law, implementation of the
rule may vary among jurisdictions. Id. Basically, the rule prevents a court from
interfering with the decision of a board of directors so long as the directors' business
judgments are: (I) attributable to any rational business purpose; and (2) made by
directors who have informed themselves of all the information reasonably available.
Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
In addition to these two requirements, the enhanced business judgment rule, sometimes
referred to as the "Unocal standard," requires directors to: (1) prove that they reasonably
believed that the acquirer threatened the company; and (2) prove that their response
(implementation of takeover defenses) was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see infra part
II.A. Thus, under the Unocal standard, a target board cannot rely on the business
judgment rule until all four requirements are met.
Although courts usually apply an enhanced business judgment rule leniently, a court
will invalidate a takeover defense that indirectly affects the right of shareholders to
participate in the premium offered by the hostile bidder if the primary purpose of the
target management is to maintain corporate control or to prevent shareholders from
obtaining the highest value for their stock. See infra part II.
16. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 707.
17. A successful hostile takeover usually results in a change in the board of directors.
Consequently, target boards often have a large stake in the outcome of a takeover
contest.
18. See infra part I1.
19. See infra part I1.
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The circumstances that surround a target board's decision to employ
a takeover defense affect a court's decision as to whether the enhanced
business judgment rule will shield directors from liability. For ex-
ample, pre-offer defenses 20 usually do not come under as much
judicial scrutiny as post-offer defenses2' and, therefore, courts are
much more likely to allow the implementation of apre-offer defense as
a mere business decision under a lenient application of the enhanced
business judgment rule.22 Courts also apply the enhanced business
judgment rule to post-takeover defenses in a lenient fashion, unless
circumstances require otherwise.23 Although courts have haphazardly
applied the enhanced business judgment rule over the years, this
Article asserts that a pattern has emerged: Courts will only scrutinize
the use of takeover defenses under an enhanced business judgment
standard when the target board implemented the defenses after it placed
the target corporation up for sale.24
This Article will provide a comprehensive examination of corporate
takeover defenses and their availability to target boards in defending
against an unwanted tender offer. Part II discusses the judicial
response to takeover defenses by describing the past uncertainty of the
application of the enhanced business judgment rule and the recent
emergence of a pattern in the courts' scrutiny of takeover defenses.
Part III analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision in the
QVC-Paramount takeover battle and demonstrates that, after QVC, a
court will scrutinize a target board's actions in response to a hostile
bid, rather than accord it protection under the business judgment rule,
only when the action is taken after the target board has placed the
target corporation up for sale. Part IV describes the most frequently
employed takeover defenses, distinguishing between those defenses
implemented in the pre-tender offer period and those defenses
implemented in the post-tender offer period. In addition, Part IV
will provide specific examples of how courts have reacted to certain
20. Pre-offer defenses are those implemented by a board of directors prior to any
tender offer. See Debra Denise Palmer, Comment, Corporate Takeover Battles-Shark
Repellant Charter and Bylaw Provisions that Deter Hostile Tender Offers or Other
Acquisitions-A Comprehensive Examination, 27 How. L.J. 1683, 1687 & n.10
(1984); see infra part IV.A.
21. Post-offer defensive tactics are those tactics implemented by a board of directors
after the acquirer makes the tender offer. See Palmer, supra note 20, at 1687 & n.10; see
infra part IV.B.
22. See infra part 1I.B.
23. See infra part 1I.B.
24. See infra note 54.
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defenses in the past and the impact of the QVC decision on the
availability of defenses in the future.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO TAKEOVER DEFENSES
The takeover contests of the 1980s shaped the current marketplace
for corporate control. These contests were fought in the courts of
Delaware by entrepreneurial raiders aligned with individual share-
holders 25 against directors and management of large public
corporations. 26 Most courts, in Delaware27 and elsewhere 28 generally
determine the validity of these defenses by applying the business judg-
ment rule in one form or another.29
A. Standards of Judicial Review: The Unocal Approach
The early decisions on the validity of takeover defenses held that the
business judgment rule protected board action. So long as directors
could articulate valid business purposes for the implementation of take-
over defenses, courts found such actions valid.3°
25. One author claims that the shareholder plaintiffs were seeking to "enforce the
right to sell their property." Samuel N. Levin, Raiding the Establishment: New
Perspectives on Takeover Law, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 507, 511 (1992).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d
1245, 1264-66 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del. 1994); see also
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179-82 (Del. 1986); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
28. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1459 (11th Cir.
1989); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986); Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903 (1986); Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1560-
61 (9th Cir. 1984); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. A minority of courts continue to hold
the view that the business judgment rule should not apply to determine the validity of
defensive measures. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 233-37 (4th ed. 1993). This Article focuses on the
decisions that apply the business judgment rule or variations thereof.
30. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (affirming
the lower court's use of the business judgment rule to validate a takeover defense), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Panter, 646 F.2d at 293-94 (noting that mere allegation
of a desire of incumbent directors to retain their positions was insufficient to shift
burden of proof to directors); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623,
634 (D. Md. 1984) (applying business judgment rule); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,
554 (Del. 1964) (applying the "primary purpose test" which was the business judgment
rule disguised in name only).
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In the seminal case, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,3 the
Delaware Supreme Court established a heightened standard of review
for takeover defenses. Under the Unocal standard,32 before target di-
rectors may rely on the business judgment rule, they have the burden
of proving: (1) that they had "reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and (2) that they
had acted "reasonabl[y] in relation to the threat posed. 33 In essence,
the Unocal court's two prong test shifted the burden under the
business judgment rule to the target board. 34 This enhanced business
judgment rule does not apply where the employed defense only serves
to perpetuate the target board in office or is used in any other inequi-
table manner.
To meet their burden of proof under Unocal, directors must show
that they acted in "good faith and [conducted a] reasonable investi-
gation" 35 in consideration of:
the adequacy and terms of the offer; its fairness and feasibility;
the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the
consequences of that financing; questions of illegality; the
impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on other
constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable
relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk of non-
consummation; the basic [shareholder] interests at stake; the
bidder's identity, prior background and other business venture
3 1. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
32. The Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Unocal standard. See,
e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d
1131 (Del. 1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Del.
1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Del. 1987);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran
v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
33. See, e.g., Stroud, 606 A.2d at 82; Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288; Newmont, 535 A.2d at
1341; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
34. The Unocal standard is an enhanced version of the business judgment rule because
it places the burden on the directors rather than on the party attacking the defenses.
Additionally, it requires that directors take action only in response to a threat. See supra
note 15.
Where the directors are purely motivated by self-interest, Delaware courts will not
apply the Unocal standard. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279; Newmont, 535 A.2d at 1341;
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. "Where actual self-interest is present and affects a majority of
the directors approving a transaction, a court will apply even more exacting scrutiny to
determine whether the transaction is entirely fair to the [shareholders]." Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994) (citing as
examples Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) and Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)).
35. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del.
1964)); see also Time, 571 A.2d at 1152; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
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experiences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation
and their effects on [shareholder] interests.36
Once the directors satisfy this burden, a court will apply the traditional
business judgment rule placing the burden on the plaintiff to establish
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, rather than shifting
the burden to the directors to prove that their actions were valid.37
Courts construing state laws outside Delaware have applied the
Unocal standard in determining the validity of takeover defenses.38
Several states, however, have rejected the Unocal standard through
legislation. 39 Nevertheless, the trend seems to be that courts con-
struing laws of states other than Delaware will approve and rely upon
the Unocal standard.40
B. Application of the Unocal Standard"
Despite the numerous instances in which courts employed the
Unocal test in the 1980s, no judicial model exists which explains the
circumstances under which directors may resist takeover bids.
Consequently, consideration of the relevant decisions of Delaware and
other courts is useful to explain recent judicial responses and to
36. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29.
37. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
38. See International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458-59 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(applying Unocal in a case governed by Florida law); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis.) (construing Wisconsin law
and relying upon Unocal), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 955 (1989); Torchmark Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070, 1081 (W.D. Mo.
1988) (construing Missouri law and applying Unocal); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston
Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986) (relying on Unocal in construing
Minnesota law), aff d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1987). But see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273
(2d Cir. 1986) (citing Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir.
1984)); Norlin, 744 F.2d at 257-58 (2d Cir. 1984) (following the traditional business
judgment rule but focusing on whether the adoption of a certain takeover defense
infringes upon the shareholders' right to govern the "ultimate destiny" of the
corporation).
39. Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have laws that reject the Unocal standard. IND.
CODE § 23-1-35-1(f) (1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(c)(1) (1993); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(d), (e) (1994). For a discussion of legislation refusing to
follow the Unocal standard, see BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 264-66.
40. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 263-66.
4 1. In applying Unocal to determine the validity of a particular defense, courts have
faced three sub-issues: (I) whether the board's actions constituted a defense; (2) whether
a threat existed; and (3) whether the defense was a reasonable response to the threat. See
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 243. The focus of this Article is under what circum-
stances and at what time takeover defenses are appropriate. This Section, therefore, will
focus on the third of these issues. For a discussion of the first two issues see BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 29, at 244-46.
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formulate guidelines for directors to follow in preparing for or in
reacting to unsolicited tender offers.
1. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal, T. Boone Pickens, heading a group that owned thirteen
percent of Unocal's stock, offered $54 per share in cash for an
additional thirty-seven percent of the outstanding stock and announced
that, if successful, he also would purchase the other fifty percent of
outstanding Unocal stock.42 Following Pickens' offer, the Unocal
board responded in two ways. First, the Unocal board rejected
Pickens' offer as inadequate based on their investment banker's
estimate that Unocal,-stock was worth $60 or more per share upon
liquidation.43 Second, the Unocal board resolved to make a self-tender
offer, in which the board offered to purchase Unocal's outstanding
stock, except those shares owned by Pickens, in exchange for $72 per
share in debt securities.'
After holding that an inadequate offer price constituted a threat to
Unocal's corporate policy, 45 the court applied the second prong of the
new Unocal test. The court addressed whether the Unocal board's
defensive action was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by
Pickens' offer.46 The court did not address this issue rigorously.
Rather, the court accepted the Unocal board's justifications at face
value.48 Although Unocal's self-tender offer was a "showstopper"
because it effectively killed Pickens' offer,49 the court found it
reasonable because Pickens' two-tiered offer was "a classic coercive
measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first
tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will
receive at the back end of the transaction."50 Not all takeover bids are
coercive; thus, whether a show stopper, like the one used in Unocal,
would be reasonable depends upon the surrounding circumstances.
In the decisions following Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court
continuously has given target boards wide latitude when responding to
42. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
43. Id. at 950.
44. Id. at 951.
45. Id. at 956. The court also viewed Pickens' offer as a two-tiered offer which
represented a substantial threat to shareholder choice. Id.
46. Id. at 955.
47. See Ragazzo, supra note 3, at 694.
48. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
49. Ragazzo, supra note 3, at 695. A "showstopper" refers to an action by one party
to a bidding contest for corporate control that causes the bidding to end.
50. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
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hostile takeover bids.5' As demonstrated by the cases set forth below,
the courts have extended the application of the Unocal standard to
include pre-tender offer defenses. 2 Moreover, judicial application of
the Unocal standard seems indistinguishable from the traditional
business judgment rule.53 The case law, however, also indicates that
courts will apply the Unocal standard rigorously in appropriate
situations: specifically, situations in which an impending sale or
change of control exists.5
4
2. Lenient Application of the Unocal Standard
One year after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
chancery court's decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc. 55
to uphold a poison pill shareholders' rights plan. 6 In Moran, the
plaintiff challenged the adoption of the plan by Household's board and
argued that it would entrench management and deny the shareholders
the opportunity to obtain a premium.57 Household's board argued that
the business judgment rule protected them in their choice of this pre-
takeover defense, especially because the Household board contained a
5 1. See Ragazzo, supra note 3, at 698; see, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985).
52. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. For examples of the various pre-tender
offer defenses, see infra part V.A.
53. See Ragazzo, supra note 3, at 702.
54. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
46 (Del. 1994) (finding an impending change of control and, thus, applying enhanced
scrutiny); Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (finding merger agreement did not constitute a change
of control and, thus, applying a more traditional business judgment rule).
When there is a pending sale of control, "the responsibility of the directors is to get
the highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders." QVC, 637 A.2d at 46
(restating the duties of directors set forth in Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989)). This responsibility is sometimes referred to as a
duty to "auction" the target corporation in an effort to obtain the best value for the
shareholders. See infra note 88.
55. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.), aff'g, 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
56. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1083. Household's defense was a preferred stock plan under
which each shareholder received one right for each common share outstanding. The
right entitled each holder to the option to buy one-hundredth of a share of a new series of
participating preferred stock which was non-redeemable and non-transferable until a
triggering event occurred. Id. at 1066. Its dividend right was 100 times that declared on
the common stock and its exercise price was $10,000 per share. The rights could be
exercised if the holder acquired 20 percent of the common stock or a tender offer was
made for 30 percent or more of the common stock. Id. The plan also provided for a "flip
over" provision. Id. For a brief explanation of poison pill shareholders' rights plans
and "flip over" provisions, see infra part IV.B.7.
57. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1067.
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majority of outside directors."
The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Household board
implemented the plan to resist potential two-tiered 59 and bust-up
offers,6 ° which constituted threats under the Unocal standard.6' In
concluding that the plan was a reasonable response under the Unocal
standard's second prong, the court noted that Household's poison pill
was not lethal to all tender offers but only to two-tiered and bust-up
offers.62 Moran exemplifies the leniency with which Delaware courts
judge target boards in allowing them to prevent takeovers. Accord-
ingly, it seems that Delaware courts sometimes apply the traditional
business judgment rule under the guise of an "enhanced" business
judgment rule.
3. Rigorous Application of the Unocal Standard
After Unocal and Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court changed
direction and applied the Unocal standard in a more rigorous manner
that was distinguishable from the traditional business judgment rule.63
As a result of the rigorous application of Unocal, corporate manage-
ment and directors became alarmed and suspicious as to what standard
they would be held to when responding to hostile tender offers.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.' concerned
the legality of a defensive tactic implemented by a board of directors in
response to a hostile tender offer.65 Specifically, the Revlon board
took pre-emptive action against an anticipated unsolicited bid by Pantry
Pride.66 The Revlon board adopted a two part plan composed of an
exchange offer67 to repurchase Revlon stock and a poison pill.68 The
58. id. at 1074-75.
59. A two-tiered offer occurs when a bidder makes an offer for less than all of the
target's shares at one price and then makes a second offer for the rest of the target's
shares at another price.
60. A bust-up offer refers to the acquirer's intent to break up the target's corporate
structure upon acquisition of the target corporation.
61. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-55.
62. Id. at 1356-57.
63. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 175-76.
66. Id. at 175. Initially, Pantry Pride proposed a friendly acquisition of Revlon at a
price between $40-50 per share. Id. at 176. Pantry Pride attempted to continue
negotiations with Revlon, but Revlon refused. Thereafter, Revlon adopted a defensive
measure to dissuade Pantry Pride. Id. at 178.
67. An "exchange" offer is an offer by the acquirer to purchase the target shares using
the acquirer's own stock, rather than cash or debt to finance the offer.
68. Id. at 177. See infra part IV.B.7 for discussion of the poison pill defense.
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board designed the plan to maximize and protect the value of Revlon's
shares when faced with a tender offer.69
Thereafter, Pantry Pride made a hostile bid for Revlon shares at
$47.50 per common share.7° The Revlon board rejected this offer as
inadequate and responded by making a self-tender offer.7 Pantry
Pride then made another offer contingent upon its receiving ninety
percent of Revlon's outstanding stock.72 Again, the Revlon board
rejected Pantry Pride's offer and began negotiating a leveraged buy
out73 with Forstmann Little and authorized management to look for
prospective buyers.74 Pantry Pride offered as much as $53 per share,
but the Revlon board approved a leveraged buy out at $56 per share.75
Pantry Pride then raised its offer to $56.25.76 Forstmann Little
countered with an offer of $57.25, subject to a no-shop provision,77 a
lock-up option, and a condition that Revlon management not
participate in the merger.78
Finally, Pantry Pride raised its offer to $58 per share and filed suit
seeking to enjoin the Forstmann Little transaction.79 The Revlon board
claimed that the Unocal business judgment rule protected its actions.
The court determined that Pantry Pride's actions posed a threat to
Revlon and, therefore, the Unocal standard applied.8s
In reaching its decision, the court examined whether the Revlon
board's actions were reasonable in response to the Pantry Pride threat.
Although the court found that the poison pill and exchange offer were
69. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. Revlon's board responded in this manner because
Revlon's investment bankers told the board that in order to finance the acquisition,
Pantry Pride would finance its tender offer with junk bonds and then break up Revlon's
divisions. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. A "leveraged buy out" refers to a transaction where the target board seeks outside
financing for its own bid for the target corporation's shares.
74. Id. at 177-78.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 177.
77. "No-shop" clauses create a promise by the target board to refrain from soliciting
other offers. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 426.
78. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. "Lock-up" options give the holder of the option,
usually a white knight, the right to purchase a lucrative portion of the target. See infra
part IV.B.6 for a discussion of white knights and lock-up options. The lock-up option
gave Forstmann Little the right to purchase two of Revlon's divisions, and could have
been exercised when a bidder acquired 40 percent of Revlon's shares. Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 178.
79. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
80. Id. at 185.
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justified, the court viewed the Revlon board's response after Pantry
Pride's $53 offer as unreasonable.8 ' Because the Revlon board acted
as if the breakup of the company was inevitable, the Delaware
Supreme Court determined that the board's duty was to act as an
auctioneer and to refrain from fending off a hostile acquirer.8 2 The
court found that the Revlon board violated its fiduciary duty by ac-
cepting Forstmann Little's offer of $57.25, which included the lock-up
option and no-shop provision.83 In reaching this conclusion, the court
found that once the Revlon board decided to sell the corporation, it had
a duty to invite all bidders to equally participate in negotiations.84
Thus, in granting the lock-up option, the board breached its "funda-
mental duty of care. 85 According to thecourt, this action required a
finding that the business judgment rule did not apply.86
Although the Revlon court invalidated the lock-up option and no-
shop provision, it allowed the poison pill plan and selective repurchase
plan. The lock-up option and no-shop provision were unreasonable
because they were adopted after Revlon was in auction stage.88 Once
placed in auction stage, a more rigorous Unocal test is applied to
determine if the board's takeover defense is reasonable.
4. Paramount v. Time: The Shift Back to Leniency
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,89 the Delaware
Supreme Court reintroduced the discretion given to target boards as
exemplified in Unocal.90 Time, which had been looking for a merger
partner for several years, eventually negotiated a deal with Warner
Brothers. 9' As a result, Time's stock which had been trading at ap-
proximately $107 the week the merger was signed, increased by more
than twenty-five percent.92
81. Id. at 182.. The Revlon board justified its actions by stating its desire to preserve
Revlon in its corporate form. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 182-84.
84. See id. at 182. Accordingly, the Revlon board's duty seemed to be to auction the
corporation to the highest bidder. Id.; see also supra note 54.
85. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 181.
88. An "auction" occurs when the target board places the target corporation up for
sale. See, e.g., id. at 182.
89. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
90. See supra part 11.B.I.
91. Time, 571 A.2d at 1147.
92. Roger Lowenstein & David B. Hilder, Time's Stock Soars Again as Some Still
Hope for Takeover Effort, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1989, at Cl, C2.
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Thereafter, Paramount made a cash offer of $175 per share for 100
percent of Time's stock.93 Time's board rejected Paramount's offer as
inadequate, based upon its investment banker's advice and the board's
belief that the long-term value of Time, plus a control premium, raised
the intrinsic value of Time's stock to greater than $175 per share.94 In
response to Paramount's offer, Time's board revised its merger plans
with Warner. Rather than proceed with a merger which would have
required shareholder approval, Time's board made a cash tender offer
for fifty-one percent of Warner's stock at a per share price greater than
the price pursuant to the original merger terms. 95 Paramount then in-
creased its offer to $200 per share, which Time's board again rejected
as inadequate.96
The Delaware Supreme Court applied the Unocal test to the Time
board's decision to restructure the Time-Warner transaction in re-
sponse to Paramount's unsolicited bid.97 The court did not examine in
detail whether the Time board's action was reasonable in response to
the Paramount threat.98 Rather, the court held that recasting the form
of the transaction to preclude Paramount's bid was a reasonable
response because it protected the Time-Warner transaction." The Del-
aware Supreme Court held that precluding Paramount's offer in this
manner was permissible because preservation of the Time-Warner
transaction was a legitimate business purpose.'0° The court also noted
that Time's board acted in good faith after a detailed investigation.' '
Time demonstrates that in the absence of a finding by a court that the
defensive measure was implemented during the auction stage, a court
will apply the Unocal standard in a manner indistinguishable from the
traditional business judgment rule. In the 1990s, the Delaware
Supreme Court generally has continued this lenient application of
Unocal, unless the target board has placed the target corporation up for
sale, thus, into the auction stage. The most recent example of this
93. Time, 571 A.2d at 1147.
94. Id. at 1147-48.
95. Id. at 1148.
96. Id. at 1149.
97. Id. at 1153.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1154-55. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that the Time board was
justified in protecting its strategic business plan without regard to comparative values.
Id. at 1154. Ironically, three years later in QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
the Paramount board's defensive actions, which were similar to those of the Time board,
were impermissible. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 49-51 (Del. 1994). For a discussion of QVC, see infra part III.A.
100. Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-54.
101. Id. at 1153-54.
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trend is Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. 102
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TAKEOVER DEFENSES
IN THE 1990S: PARAMOUNT V. QVC
Although many legal issues remain unresolved from the takeover
frenzy of the 1980s, 10 3 one unresolved issue of particular significance
is under what circumstances target directors can use takeover defenses
to resist a hostile takeover.'O° The trend in the 1990s is for courts to
uphold reasonable takeover defenses that target boards implement to
further viable business plans unless a particular defense interferes with
the decision-making power of shareholders.' °5 As exemplified by
Q VC, courts will find that a takeover defense interferes with
shareholders' decision-making power when a target board adopts such
a defense after Revlon has been triggered. 0 6 Although under certain
circumstances courts will find takeover defenses that are implemented
before Revlon is triggered unreasonable, such defenses usually will
withstand judicial scrutiny under the Unocal approach if a valid
business purpose exists.
A. The Facts
The takeover contest between QVC Network Inc. and Viacom Inc.
over Paramount Communications Inc. began on September 12,
1993.107 After four years of negotiations, Viacom and Paramount en-
tered into a friendly merger agreement (the "Merger Agreement") and a
stock option agreement (the "Stock Option Agreement") worth $9.2
billion in aggregate.108 The public announcement of the Merger Agree-
102. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
103. Outstanding issues include: what the fiduciary duties of directors, management
and attorneys are in a sale of control; when these duties are triggered; and whether the
fiduciary duties of corporate directors extend to non-corporate settings.
104. See Levin, supra note 25, at 511.
105. Under the laws of many states, fundamental corporate changes are subject to
approval by shareholder vote, including mergers, elections of directors, and so forth.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 805, § 5/7.85 (West
1993). Accordingly, courts seek to protect shareholders from interference with voting
rights. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 (citing other Delaware cases for this proposition).
106. Revlon is triggered in a hostile takeover situation when the target board has
"abandon[ed] its long term strategy and [has sought] an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company." Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 30
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,006 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993). In QVC, the Delaware
Supreme Court clarified this rule explaining that Revlon is triggered if a company either
puts itself into play, or plans a reorganization involving a clear breakup. See QVC, 637
A.2d at 47-48.
107. 635 A.2d 1245, 1250-51 (Del. Ch. 1993).
108. Id. The Paramount board approved the Merger Agreement and the Stock Option
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ment and Stock Option Agreement stated that Viacom was "acquiring"
Paramount, "but clarified that Paramount was for sale only to
Viacom."', 9
The Merger Agreement required the Paramount board to amend its
poison pill rights agreement to prevent it from triggering upon the
closing of the Merger Agreement." 0 Furthermore, the Merger Agree-
ment contained a no-shop provision, which prohibited Paramount
from soliciting or considering competitive transactions unless required
by law."' A termination provision also protected the deal by pro-
viding Viacom with a termination fee of $100 million if one of the
following events occurred: Paramount terminated the Merger
Agreement in favor of a competing transaction; the Paramount
shareholders failed to approve the merger; or, the Paramount board
recommended a competing transaction."2 The Stock Option Agree-
ment created a lock-up stock option, which permitted Viacom to
purchase 19.9% of Paramount's common stock at $69.14 per share or
to put the option to Paramount and receive 16.7% of the bidding price
from a competitor." 3 In effect, the Merger Agreement and Stock
Option Agreement would shift voting control from the public Para-
mount shareholders to Mr. Sumner Redstone ("Redstone"), who was
the majority shareholder of Viacom through NAI which Redstone
controls.' 14
Eight days later, QVC offered to acquire Paramount for
approximately $9.5 billion." 5 On that same day, Viacom and Para-
Agreement within three hours based on detailed term sheets of the agreements, a
business overview of the Viacom-Paramount entity, and pro forma financial data. Id. at
1251. The Paramount board also discussed its fiduciary duties with respect to the
proposed merger. Id. at 1252.
In entering into the Merger Agreement, the Paramount board also relied upon a fairness
opinion that explicitly denied that any "market check" had been undertaken. Id. at 1251
n. II. A target board conducts a "market check" when it compares the bid against the fair
market value of the target. If the target is a public corporation (as in Viacom's case), the
fair market value is probably its trading value. The board's reliance on the "market
check" is significant because when Revlon is triggered in a friendly merger or takeover
case, courts require some form of proof that the friendly merger or takeover obtains the
best value for shareholders. See QVC, 634 A.2d at 44. In the past, courts have found
that a "market check" is adequate to satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
109. QVC, 635 A.2d at 1252.
110. Id. at 1251.
ll. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. James Bates, Paramount Deal: As Show Closes, a Look at the Script, L.A.
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mount made a public announcement cautioning against QVC's bid.1 6
Paramount also publicly announced that Viacom's offer provided the
best option for Paramount in the long run, but that the Paramount
board would consider QVC's offer." 7
On October 11, the Paramount board authorized negotiations with
QVC." 8 According to QVC, Paramount delayed negotiations and,
thus, on October 21, QVC filed suit and made a hostile tender offer for
Paramount."' 9 In response to QVC's actions, Paramount and Viacom
revised the Merger Agreement (the "Amended Merger Agreement")
and the Stock Option Agreement (the "Amended Stock Option
Agreement") as follows: (1) Viacom would make a tender offer for 51
percent of Paramount's outstanding share for $80 per share, followed
by a stock-for-stock exchange valued at $80 per share; 120 (2) Para-
mount would revise its poison pill rights plan and the termination
provision to allow the Paramount board to reject the Viacom offer in
favor of a competing transaction to avoid breaching its fiduciary
duties;' 2' and (3) the buy-out alternative cash payment contained in the
Stock Option Agreement would be based upon a successful bid rather
than on a five-day average market price' 122
The Paramount board reviewed one-page summaries of the QVC
and Viacom proposals and comparisons of the transactions.' 23
Thereafter, the Paramount board approved the revised Viacom
transaction. 24 Meanwhile, QVC and Viacom raised their bids, and the
Paramount board continued to reject QVC's advances. 125 By the time
the Delaware Chancery Court eventually considered QVC's lawsuit,
QVC's first-step tender offer was at $90 per share in cash and its
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1994, at Al. QVC's initial offer was approximately $9.5 billion, while
Viacom's was approximately $9.2 billion. Id.
116. QVC, 635 A.2d at 1252.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1253.
1 19. QVC offered to pay $80 per share in cash for 51 percent of Paramount's
outstanding shares and a stock-for-stock exchange for the remaining shares (second-step
merger). Id. QVC's common stock was worth a little over $80 per share on October 27,
1993, the commencement date of the QVC tender offer. Id.
120. Id. at 1254.
121. Id. at 1254-55.
122. Id. at 1255.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1256.
125. Although QVC's bids were higher than Viacom's, the Paramount board
determined that QVC's offers were highly contingent and not the best alternative in the
long run. Id. at 1255-59.
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second-step was at $90 per share in securities.126 By contrast,
Viacom's first-step tender offer was at $85 per share in cash and its
second-step was at $85 per share in securities. 2 7
B. The Court Battles
In taking the QVC-Viacom battle to the Delaware courts, QVC and
certain Paramount shareholders sought, inter alia: (1) to invalidate the
lock-up and break-up fee provisions agreed upon by Paramount and
Viacom; (2) to enjoin Viacom's tender offer until the lock-up and
poison pill agreements were invalidated; and (3) to require Para-
mount's board to remove all other defenses to QVC's hostile bid. 128
On November 24, the Delaware chancery court preliminarily enjoined:
(1) the Paramount defendants from amending or modifying the
Paramount stockholder rights plan, from taking any other action to
facilitate the Viacom tender offer, or taking action to consummate the
Merger Agreement or the Amended Merger Agreement; and (2) the
Paramount defendants and Viacom from taking any action to exercise
any part of the Stock Option Agreement.' 29 The chancery court,
however, refused to enjoin the termination fee. 3 ° Thereafter, the
Paramount defendants and Viacom appealed to the Delaware Supreme
Court. "'
On December 9, 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision to bar certain takeover defenses adopted by the
Paramount board. 32 After reciting the facts of the case, the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that it would analyze the Paramount board's
actions using an enhanced business judgment rule because this was
one of the "rare situations which mandate[s] that a court take a more
direct and active role in overseeing the decisions made and actions
taken by directors."'' 33 The Delaware Supreme Court set forth a two-
step analysis that courts must follow when applying enhanced
scrutiny.' 34 First, a court must make a determination as to whether the
directors' actions were based upon an informed decision. 35 Second, a
126. Id. at 1256.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1246.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1271.
131. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994).
132. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its final opinion on Feb. 4, 1994.
133. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
134. Id. at 43-46 (restating the test under Unocal and its progeny).
135. Id. at 44-45.
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court must examine the reasonableness of the board's actions.3 6
The court concluded that in the case at bar, two events required the
court to apply enhanced scrutiny: (1) a change of control had oc-
curred; 137 and (2) the target corporation had adopted defensive
measures in response to a hostile bid. 38  Accordingly, because the
Paramount-Viacom transaction triggered Revlon, 139 the Paramount
board had the following obligations in making an informed decision
and in taking reasonable action. First, the Paramount board needed to
critically examine the QVC offers and the Viacom-Paramount tran-
sactions. 40 Second, the Paramount board must have acted in good
faith. 4 ' Third, the Paramount board had to review all reasonably
available and material information to determine which alternative
provided the best value to the shareholders. 142 Fourth, the Paramount
board was required to negotiate fairly with all potential suitors in its
attempt to obtain the best value for the Paramount shareholders.1 43
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Paramount board
breached these obligations because its process was unreasonable and
its actions were not taken to maximize shareholder value. 44
The court determined that the Paramount board failed in its duties
because the Paramount board did not properly investigate the alter-
natives. Specifically, the Paramount board failed to give sufficient
attention to "the potential consequences of the defensive measures
136. Id.
137. Id. at 42. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that the Paramount-Viacom
transaction would result in a corporate change in control because before the Paramount-
QVC transaction, the public shareholders controlled Paramount but after the transaction
the public shareholders would be a minority. Id. A change in control is sometimes
referred to as the triggering of Revlon. See supra note 106.
138. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42. Although the court implied that either a triggering of
Revlon or an adoption of defensive measures in response to a threat of corporate control
implicates Unocal, in reality the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC and other cases only
applied enhanced scrutiny where defensive measures were at issue and when Revlon was
already triggered. Compare id. at 48-49 with Time, 571 A.2d at 1151-52. Furthermore,
the QVC court stated that it has recognized that a target board may resist a hostile bid
where "a potential sale of control by a corporation is not the consequence of a [target]
board's action ...." QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 n.13.
139. Because the Merger Agreement would have caused the majority ownership
interest to change from the public Paramount shareholders to Redstone, the Delaware
Supreme Court determined that Revlon was triggered at the time Paramount entered into
the merger agreement with Viacom. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43, 48.
140. Id. at 48.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court emphasized that the Paramount board needed to critically evaluate
the reasonableness of each defensive measure individually. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at49.
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demanded by Viacom."' 4' Furthermore, the Paramount board failed to
adequately consider the QVC offer while relying on its claim of a
strategic alliance with Viacom.' 46 In short, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the Paramount board members "chose to wall them-
selves off from material information . . . and to hide behind the
defensive measures" rather than use the QVC offer to obtain the best
value for the Paramount shareholders.1
47
The Delaware Supreme Court held that a court must be satisfied that
the course of action determined by the directors, in the context of a sale
of control, was reasonably calculated to secure the best value available
to the Paramount shareholders2.48 The court addressed the following
actions taken by Paramount: (1) entering into the Stock Option Agree-
ment which gave Viacom a lock-up stock option; (2) agreeing to a no-
shop provision and "fiduciary out" provision;' 49 (3) agreeing to the
proposed disparate use of the poison pill plan as to the Viacom and
QVC offers, respectively; and (4) providing for a termination fee.' 5
The court determined that these defensive measures were designed
to impede potential competing bidders and, thus, were unrea-
sonable.' 5' Consequently, the Paramount board's actions were in
violation of its fiduciary duties and the Delaware Supreme Court
invalidated all of the defensive measures.' 5
2
After losing in the courts, Viacom was declared the winner for a
price of $9.7 billion in cash and stock.' 53 In the end, the Paramount
shareholders and not the Delaware Supreme Court declared Viacom the
winner over QVC.' 54
145. Id. at 49.
146. Id. at 49-50.
147. Id. at 51.
148. Id. at 44.
149. A "fiduciary out" provision allows the target board to withdraw from an
acquisition agreement (where the target is being sold) in the event the board members'
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders would be breached if they
followed through with the acquisition agreement.
150. Id. at 48-51.
151. Id. at 50-51.
152. Id. The court also noted that under Delaware law, directors of a corporation are
not bound by any agreement that violates their fiduciary duties to shareholders. Id. at
51.
153. Hubert B. Herring, Business Diary: Redstone Stands Victorious on a Littered
Battleground, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1994, at C2.
154. The courts should leave the ultimate decision in a takeover contest up to the
target shareholders. Thus, on its face, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in QVC
seems appropriate. In the long run, however, the shareholders who continue their
ownership may be harmed because Viacom incurred a substantial amount of debt in its
eventual acquisition of Paramount. See Herring, supra note 153.
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IV. POST-QVC: THE AVAILABILITY OF TAKEOVER DEFENSES
As described above, target boards have adopted a variety of
defensive measures in the past, including: 55 (1) stock repurchases;
(2) no-shop provisions; (3) acceleration of loans; (4) golden
parachutes; (5) engagement of white knights; (6) sale of crown jewels;
(7) employee stock option plans ("ESOPs"); (8) defensive lawsuits;
and (9) poison pill rights plans. The litany of takeover defenses
continually changes as new takeover defenses are created and existing
defenses are modified to resist hostile tender offers. 5 6 Consequently,
to list and describe every defense is an insurmountable task.
A brief description
. 
of the common takeover defenses employed by
target management follows. These defenses can be divided into two
broad classes: (1) pre-tender offer defenses; and (2) post-tender offer
defenses.5 7 Moreover, each broad class can be broken down into
subclasses, which are generalizations of the types of defenses imple-
mented by target boards.
This part describes the various types of takeover defenses, their
availability to targets in the past, and whether the recent QVC decision
will impact their validity in the future.
A. Pre-Tender Offer Defenses
In order to discourage unsolicited offers from unwanted
acquisitions, target boards often take precautions (known as "shark
repellents"), to defend against takeovers. These precautions require
amendments to a corporation's charter or modifications to existing
corporate contracts.'58 Generally, these defenses make hostile take-
overs more difficult. Because target boards do not implement pre-
tender offer defenses in response to hostile bids, Unocal's enhanced
Viacom's "win" over QVC gave Viacom and Redstone majority ownership of
Paramount. This win, however, was not without its costs which included a substantial
decrease in the value of Viacom's stock, a debt of $10 billion, and many disgruntled
shareholders. Id.
155. For an explanation of each defense, see infra parts IV.A, B.
156. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6, at 571 (1986).
157. Id.; see, e.g., Palmer, supra note 20, at 1686-87 (classifying defenses into pre-
tender and post-tender tactics).
Dividing takeover defenses into two classes serves two purposes. First, it provides
organization for this Article. Second, and more importantly, courts analyze the validity
of takeover defenses using.different standards depending upon whether the defense at
issue was implemented prior to a tender offer or after a hostile bidder has made a tender
offer.
158. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576.
[Vol. 26
1994] Corporate Takeover Defenses After QVC
business judgment rule does not apply in most cases. 59 Most courts
apply the traditional business judgment rule in their determination of
the validity of pre-tender offer defenses. 60 The recent QVC decision
reinforces this proposition and allows target boards to feel comfortable
in their adoption of takeover defenses in the pre-tender period.
1. Supermajority Provisions
This defense involves an amendment to a potential target
corporation's charter that increases the percentage of shareholder votes
to as high as eighty percent to approve director elections, mergers, and
other corporate changes.16' By increasing the percentage of share-
holder votes in these instances, the acquirer will find it more difficult
to complete its acquisition in the event the acquirer plans to follow up
the acquisition of the control block with a freezeout merger. i62
To determine whether supermajority provisions are valid defenses,
courts make a preliminary inquiry into whether the governing state
corporation law allows inclusion of such provisions in a corporation's
charter.163 Next, courts look at whether the board's adoption of the
supermajority provisions constitutes a valid exercise of business
judgment. Under the business judgment rule, courts have upheld
supermajority provisions unless circumstances indicate that no valid
159. See supra part ll.B.
160. Courts, however, will look at whether any amendment to a corporation's charter
or modification to an existing contract is permissible under the governing state's
statutory and common law.
161. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576; Responsibilities of Corporate
Officers, supra note 15, [ 702.
162. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576.
163. For example, section 212(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides
that a holder of stock in a Delaware corporation is entitled to one vote per share held,
unless the charter provides otherwise. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1991); see
ERNEST L. FOLK III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS § 212 (3d ed. 1993). Courts have upheld the statutory
authority of Delaware corporations to place supermajority provisions in their charters.
See, e.g., Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977) (holding that
charter provisions for voting power based upon the size of each shareholder's holding
are valid); Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 275 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(reaffirming that Delaware allows flexibility to shareholders in creating the capital
structure of their firm and recognizing that differing classes of stock with different
voting rights are permissible under Delaware law). Courts also have upheld
supermajority provisions under the state corporation laws of Iowa and Pennsylvania.
Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Pennsylvania
law does not require a policy of one vote per share in common stock, and restrictions on
the transferability of shares are valid unless manifestly unreasonable); Kersten v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647, 649 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (upholding the
amendments approved by the shareholders because the Iowa code neither prohibited nor
permitted voting restrictions at issue).
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business plan existed. 164
2. Veto Stock
This defense involves an amendment to a corporate charter to create
a class of stock with veto power over mergers or other organic
changes.161 Similar to the supermajority provisions, veto stock creates
an obstacle to completion of a hostile takeover.
For implementation of veto stock to withstand judicial scrutiny, the
corporation law of the governing state must allow such stock.
166
Furthermore, the board's adoption of the veto stock provisions must
constitute a valid exercise of business judgment.
3. Blank Check Preferred Stock
This defense also involves amendment to a corporate charter to
create a class of stock, the final terms of which the board determines at
its discretion. 167 As with other shark repellents, the effect of blank
check preferred stock is to make the corporation unattractive to the
acquirer.
Again, courts scrutinize this defense using a two-step inquiry.
First, such stock must be allowed under the governing state
corporation law. 168 Second, the board's adoption of the blank check
preferred stock provisions must constitute a valid exercise of business
judgment. 169
164. See Baron, 646 F. Supp. at 698 (denying preliminary injunctive relief in a
challenge to the board's adoption of supermajority provisions); Hahn v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., Civil Action No. 9097 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1987) (finding that the board's adoption
of supermajority provisions subject to shareholder approval constituted a valid exercise
of business judgment); Packer v. Yampol, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 332 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,
1986) (enjoining the board's reclassification plans involving supervoting stock during
a proxy contest because the board's purpose was to entrench itself, which is not a valid
exercise of business judgment). Note that the board adopted supermajority provisions in
Packer as a post-tender offer defense.
165. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576.
166. For example, section 15 1(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides
that a Delaware corporation may issue stock with no voting powers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 151(a) (1991).
167. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702 (1991).
168. For example, section 15 1(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides
that the board of directors of a Delaware corporation may use resolutions to adopt,
modify, or amend the terms of stock, provided the certificate of incorporation clearly
and expressly authorizes such board action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(9) (1991).
169. Since the blank check preferred stock provision is a pre-tender defense, courts
will not apply heightened scrutiny. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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4. Staggered Board
This defense also involves an amendment of the charter to create a
staggered board of directors. 170 A staggered board is a board whose
members are elected in different years. Implementation of a staggered
board may cause an acquirer to have to wait several years before it
controls the board of directors. Because the acquirer would not
control the board initially, the acquirer would not have the power to
change management or the corporation's business plan.17'
As with the other pre-tender offer defenses, courts will allow
amendment of the charter to create a staggered board of directors
provided the amendment is allowed under the governing corporation
law and the amendment was made for a valid business reason.
5. Accelerated Loans
This defense involves revisions to the corporation's loan agreements
in order to make them become payable in the event of a hostile
takeover. 173 Acceleration of the loans would obligate the corporation
to pay large sums of money to its creditors. Effectively, this defense
creates a procedural obligation for the acquirer because the acquirer
merely would have to refinance the loan. 74
Generally, boards of directors (or their hand-picked management)
have the sole decision-making power over corporate matters, including
entering into and modifying contracts. 175 Accordingly, any decision to
revise a corporation's loan agreements to become payable in the event
of a hostile takeover will be subject to the business judgment rule.176
6. Golden Parachutes
This defense requires management to arrange employment contracts
with management and key employees to increase their post-
170. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576.
171. Id.
i 72. For further discussion of staggered boards as defensive measures, see RALPH C.
FERRARA ET AL., TAKEOVERS: ATTACK AND SURVIVAL 334 (1987).
173. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 576. Because this defense does not
involve amendment to the corporate charter, a shareholder vote on revisions to the loan
agreements probably is not required. See id.
174. Id. at 577.
175. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE
125 (3d ed. 1988).
176. As explained earlier, the business judgment rule applies rather than the Unocal
standard because pre-tender offer defenses are not implemented in response to a threat.
See supra part IV.A.
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employment compensation in the event of a hostile takeover. 17 When
golden parachutes are created for management and key employees, a
corporation becomes less attractive to the acquirer because generous
payments to departing management could financially deplete the
corporation. 17
8
Because golden parachutes are a form of executive compensation
arrangements, some courts test the validity of these arrangements
under a "reasonableness" standard rather than the traditional business
judgment rule.'79 Courts generally allow adoption of golden para-
chutes as pre-tender offer defenses provided that disinterested directors
approve them and the board exercises care in approving the
agreement.18
0
B. Post-Tender Offer Defenses
Target boards have a wide array of defenses which they can employ
to resist unsolicited tender offers from unwanted acquirers.' s' These
defenses may have one or more of the following effects: (1) to thwart
the takeover bid; (2) to increase the acquirer's bidding price; or (3) to
damage the target corporation. 8 2 After QVC, target boards must
refrain from employing takeover defenses once Revlon has been
triggered, unless the target board clearly intends such defenses to serve
as a mechanisms to maximize target shareholder value.
1. Propaganda
Target boards may use corporate funds to issue press releases,
advertise and further communicate their anti-takeover arguments to
target shareholders. 8 3 Propaganda as a defense to a premium offer,
however, may backfire because target shareholders may deem a target
177. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 577.
178. Id.
179. See International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1989);
Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232-35 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815 F.2d
76 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Nault v. XTRA Corp., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,022, at 94,501 (D. Mass. July 9, 1992). But see Tate & Lyle PLC v.
Stanley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,764, at 98,585 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988).
180. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459-60; Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 232-
33; Bender v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 598 F. Supp. 178, 189 n.16 (E.D. Pa.
1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1985); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr.
702, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
181. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 571.
182. See Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702.
183. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 571-72.
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board's negative advertising suspect.' 4
In QVC, the chancery court focused on two public announcements
made by the Paramount board. The Paramount board had announced
that the company was only for sale to Viacom and that the board would
consider the QVC offer despite the fact that the Viacom deal was
better. I8 5 This propaganda hurt Paramount in the long run because it
provided evidence that the Paramount board had decided to consum-
mate the Viacom deal without adequately considering other offers.
Because Revlon had been triggered, the Paramount board had the duty
to consider all offers. Thus, the public announcements served as
evidence of the Paramount board's breach of its fiduciary duties.
2. Litigation
Target management also may commence litigation against an
unwanted acquirer. 8 6 These defensive suits may allege violations of
securities laws, antitrust laws, and other regulatory laws, or any other
laws.' 87 This litigation effectively delays commencement of an
unwanted tender offer and provides a target board with time to imple-
ment other defenses.'88 Moreover, litigation may compel the acquirer
to provide more complete disclosure. 89 In some instances, more
disclosure (i.e., plans for the target's future) may cause the target
shareholders to develop a negative impression of the acquirer.
Generally, the business judgment rule protects a target board that
authorizes a defensive suit against the hostile acquirer, provided that
the claims are not frivolous.' 90 Accordingly, a court will typically
uphold a target board's commencement of litigation as a defense to a
hostile bid.' 9' The decision in QVC did not address this defensive
184. As with other defenses, courts would apply the Unocal standard to determine the
validity of propaganda in the event the propaganda was deemed a "defense." See supra
note 41.
185. See supra part III.B.
186. See BLOCK Er AL., supra note 29, at 677; CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 572.
187. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 667; CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6, at 572.
188. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 678.
189. The federal securities laws require disclosure of certain information by a party
who acquires more than 5 percent of the outstanding stock of a public corporation. See
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
190. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-19
(W.D. Mich. 1978); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 835, 843
(Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985).
191. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't. Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Plaza Sec. Co. v. Office, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1145 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1986).
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measure. If, however, the purpose of defensive litigation is only to
thwart an unsolicited offer during an auction situation, a court will
likely find that a target board has breached its fiduciary duty in taking
such action.
3. White Squire Transactions
The white squire defense involves the placing of a substantial block
of stock in the hands of friendly investors who are not interested in
acquiring control. 92 Several variations of the white squire defense
exist: (1) selling stock to friendly third parties; 193 (2) issuing more
stock for the target corporation's ESOP;' 94 and (3) obtaining financing
necessary to restructure or complete other corporate transactions.195
The primary effect of white squire transactions is to increase a target
board's voting power and, thus, make it difficult or impossible for an
unwanted acquirer to obtain control of the target.' 96
Courts apply either the traditional business judgment rule' 97 or the
Unocal standard'9 " to white squire transactions.' 99 In either case,
courts uphold these transactions provided the target board has exer-
cised prudent business judgment in an effort to protect the rights of the
target shareholder. For example, a court may refuse to enjoin a sale of
stock to friendly third parties when the target board effects a sale of
192. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 348.
193. See id. The effect of issuing and selling more stock to friendly parties is two-
fold. First, it dilutes the acquirer's percentage ownership. Second, it increases the target
board's voting power.
194. See id. ESOPs are retirement plans that allow employees to invest in the
corporation. See id. at 363. As a defense, ESOPs may block completion of a hostile
takeover because they provide management with increased voting power. See id.
195. See id. at 348, 396. Sometimes referred to as "bridge financing," this defense
involves short-term loans from a lender who may receive a voting position in exchange.
Id. at 396. Again, the effect is to increase target management's voting power. See id.
196. See id.
197. Glazer v. Zapata Corp., Civil Action No. 12958, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77 (Del.
Ch. May 14, 1993); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch.
1989); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, 14 DEL. I. CORP. L. 661 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 1988).
198. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987);
Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 663 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 7, 1989). Courts applying the Unocal standard will enjoin white squire
transactions if the sales to third parties are motivated solely for entrenchment purposes.
Manbourne, Inc. v. Conrad, 796 F.2d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1986); Gregory v. Correction
Connection, Inc., Civil Action No. 88-7990, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3659 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 1991).
199. Although judicial decisions to use either the traditional business judgment rule
or the Unocal standard when evaluating white squire transactions seems arbitrary, their
inconsistent actions are probably due to the unsettled state of the law on the validity of
takeover defenses until the recent QVC decision.
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stock, but it will do so only after the target board determines that the
unfriendly bid was inadequate. 200 Furthermore, a court will find a
white squire transaction valid provided that it does not prevent the
target shareholders from choosing to vote for the hostile bidder.20
Unlike the white squire transactions involving third party sales,
courts applying Unocal judge white squire transactions involving
ESOPs more harshly. Courts reason that during takeover battles,
ESOPs by nature give rise to a strong inference of management en-
trenchment.2 °2 If, however, a target board can prove that the ESOP
was planned prior to the commencement of the hostile bid, a court will
find that the ESOP is protected under the business judgment rule.2 3
Because white squire transactions do not increase shareholder value
and instead burden the target corporation financially, post-QVC courts
will not uphold such transactions if Revlon has been triggered.
4. Stock Manipulation
Similar to white squire transactions, the stock manipulation defense
also involves stock transactions which may prevent an acquirer from
completing a tender offer.2°4 A target board may manipulate the target
corporation's stock by: (1) repurchasing stock from target share-
holders; 215 (2) paying greenmail2' to the acquirer for target shares that
he has already acquired; 20 7 (3) making a self-tender or exchange offer
to the target shareholders; 20 8 and (4) paying extraordinary divi-
200. See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. AT & T, 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
201. See, e.g., News Int'l PLC v. Warner Communications, Inc., Civil Action No.
7420, 1984 WL 21871 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1984) (where no evidence was presented that
third party was under obligation to vote its shares with target's management, nor that it
was likely to do so).
202. See, e.g., RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1991);
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); NCR, 761 F. Supp. at
475. But see Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989).
203. British Printing & Communication Corp. PLC v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519, 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally In re Anderson,
Clayton Shareholders Litigation, 519 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1986).
204. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 458; CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6.
205. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6. Repurchases are effective only if the
incumbent management or controlling group has a substantial block of stock. Id. This
defensive measure could then result in the incumbent group obtaining voting control of
the target corporation. Id.
206. To pay "greenmail" means that the target will purchase shares from the acquirer
at a premium contingent upon the acquirer discontinuing the takeover attempt. CLARK,
supra note 156, § 13.6; Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702.
207. See CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6.
208. See BLOCK Er AL., supra note 29, at 458. Self-tender offers and exchange offers
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dends. 20 9  This defense, in its various forms, causes the target
corporation to incur debt, thus making the corporation less attractive to
the acquirer. 2
10
State statutes usually limit stock repurchases to prevent impairment
of a corporation's capital.2" Under the Unocal approach, courts up-
hold repurchase programs in the form of self-tender offers and
exchange offers, provided the target boards have used sound business
judgment in their decision to commence a repurchase program. 1 2
Likewise, in testing the validity of extraordinary dividend transactions
that act to restructure the corporation, courts may apply the Unocal
standard and uphold extraordinary dividend transactions. 2,3
Courts will apply the enhanced business judgment rule to stock
repurchase programs and extraordinary dividend transactions that are
adopted or invoked in response to a hostile bid by targets in auction-
mode. Moreover, courts following QVC probably will invalidate
stock manipulations adopted or invoked after Revlon has been trig-
gered because the effect of stock manipulation is to make the target less
attractive rather than to entice the hostile bidder to increase its bid and,
thus, increase shareholder value.
5. Sale of Crown Jewels
The sale of crown jewels defense involves a sale of the
corporation's valuable assets or divisions of business (referred to as
''crown jewels") that usually make the corporation an attractive
are made to all of the target corporation's shareholders. Id. at 459. The effects of this
version of stock manipulation may include: (I) diverting shares from the acquirer; (2)
making the target corporation less attractive by burdening it with debt; (3) creating
future financing problems for the target corporation; and (4) increasing management's
percentage control. Id.
209. Id. at 458. The effects of declaring a dividend are similar to those from a self-
tender or exchange offer. Id. Unlike a self-tender or exchange offer, this version of
stock manipulation does not require shareholder action. Id. at 483.
2 10. Id. at 458 (stating that self-tender offers, exchange offers and extraordinary
dividends make the corporation less attractive by depleting cash or incurring debt).
211. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1991); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 805, §
5/9.05-.10 (West 1993).
212. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986);
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55; Shamrock Holdings Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278,
286-87 (Del. Ch. 1989); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 111-12 (Del. Ch. 1986). But see Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (exchange plan was a
valid measure, but after the point that a break-up of the company was inevitable, the
board's responsibilities changed to getting the best price). These cases demonstrate
that courts will enjoin repurchase programs instituted after the target board has placed
the corporation up for sale. Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d 173, with Polaroid, 559 A.2d
278. See supra part III.B for a discussion of the QVC decision.
213. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 482-83.
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target.2"4 While the sale of crown jewels may make the target
corporation less attractive to the acquirer, it may also impair the
target's financial condition." 5
Courts generally uphold crown jewel asset sales on business
judgment grounds. 16 A court, however, will enjoin these transactions
where the target board has acted "to keep control of the company
entrenched within the present board of directors regardless of the
company's real best interests or else to dismember it piece by piece,
even to the point of liquidation of the enterprise. 21 7 In short, target
boards are not bound by agreements that violate their fiduciary duties
to shareholders. 1 8 The recent QVC decision reinforces this
proposition and suggests that target boards should refrain from
entering into crown jewel asset sales if Revlon has already been
triggered.
6. White Knight Transactions
Target boards implement the white knight defense by searching for a
rival bidder (referred to as a "white knight") who is friendly to
incumbent management or the controlling group.21 9 White knights
fend off hostile acquirers because they are willing to acquire the target
corporation, usually pursuant to better terms than the acquirer.220
Frequently, target management obtains a white knight by giving it
214. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702; BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 399.
215. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702; BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 399.
216. See, e.g., Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 846 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 949 (N.D,
II1. 1982); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 6155, 1980 WL 6430
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1980).
217. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 862 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). Although this case was decided prior to Unocal, courts will deem management's
entrenchment a conflict of interest and refuse to protect the target board under the
business judgment rule. See supra part 11.
218. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 51 (holding such agreements invalid and unenforceable).
Although the QVC court interpreted Delaware law, history shows that other states tend to
follow Delaware's lead.
219. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 403, CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6.
220. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 403.
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lock-up stock or asset option advantages, no-shop provisions 222 or
breakup fee expense reimbursements 2 3 and so forth. 24 In the event
the hostile acquirer beats the white knight in the takeover contest, these
provisions impair the target corporation's financial condition, thus
making the target less attractive to the acquirer.
Courts have upheld and enjoined transactions with white knights
depending upon the facts and circumstances. Courts allow lock-up
options, provided that they are reasonable under Unocal.225 If a target
board adopts a lock-up option after Revlon has been triggered, a court
will not uphold the provision. 6 Since Unocal, courts have repeatedly
invalidated lock-up asset agreements, but in most of these cases
Revlon had been triggered.227 Similar to the lock-up asset agreements,
courts generally enjoin no-shop provisions.228 Despite the similarity to
221. See BLOCK Er AL., supra note 29, at 403; CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6. Target
management gives asset options when it enters into a sales contract with the white
knight for a valuable portion of the target corporation and the contract is not subject to
shareholder approval. CLARK, supra note 156, § 13.6. These options may insure that
the white knight will take control of the corporation. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29,
at 404; Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702.
222. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 426. These provisions reduce the possibility
that a white knight will lose the takeover battle to a better offer. Id. See supra note 77
for a definition of no-shop provisions.
223. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 ($100 million fee if the deal did not close).
Break-up fee reimbursement provisions require the target to pay a specific amount to the
white knight in the event that the transaction is not consummated. BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 29, at 440-41.
224. See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 403-58 (discusses examples and
terms of white knight transactions).
225. Grimes v. John P. McCarthy Profit Sharing Plan, 610 A.2d 715 (Del. 1992)
(affirming the Chancery Court's disposition that lock-up provision did not interfere
with the market); see In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
[1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,585, at 92,739-40 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 8, 1991), aff'd sub nom. Grimes v. McCarthy Profit Sharing Plan, 610 A.2d 725
(Del. 1992); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,189 at 91,012-13 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1991) (stating that window shop clause
in the agreement did not operate as a "lock out" provision).
226. See, e.g., QVC, 634 A.2d at 45 (noting that enhanced judicial scrutiny will be
required before business judgment rule applies).
227. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282-
83 (2d Cir. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280-82
(Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 183-84
(Del. 1986).
228. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282
(2d Cir. 1986); QVC, 637 A.2d at 51; Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. But see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1990); Barkan v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989). The court's decision in Time
seems to be an anomaly. Furthermore, in Barkan, the court found that the hostile bid
may have been inadequate.
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no-shop provisions, courts have allowed break-up fees that maximize
shareholder value.229
Judicial inconsistency regarding treatment of white knight transac-
tions has been resolved by the QVC court's focus on the timing of the
target board's actions. If a target board adopts a white knight trans-
action after Revlon has been triggered, a court will invalidate the white
knight transaction. 3 °
7. Poison Pill Shareholder Rights Plans
Numerous versions of the poison pill defense exist. Poison pills
have the effect of making a takeover prohibitively expensive by issuing
stock rights that entitle shareholders to purchase common stock at a
special price,23' to receive extra dividends,232 and so forth.233 Because
these rights mature upon success of the acquirer, the target corporation
becomes less attractive to the acquirer.
Courts will allow target boards to adopt poison pill shareholder
rights plans as appropriate exercises of business judgment.234
However, at the time a hostile tender offer invokes the poison pill
plan, courts will evaluate whether the plan's effect complies with the
Unocal standard. 235 Although courts have upheld poison pill plans
during the auction context, the trend is to disallow any defenses
during this period. The recent QVC decision reinforces this propo-
229. Samjens Partners v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); In re Vitalink, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 92,739-40.
230. See supra part II1.B.
231. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 519-21.
232. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 15, 702.
233. See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 29, at 519-70. The poison pill plans
usually are triggered by either a "flip over" provision or a "flip in" provision. Both of
these provisions trigger the poison pill plan upon the acquirer's purchase of a certain
amount of the target corporation's stock.
234. See, e.g., A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc. v. Guste, 706 F. Supp. 1283, 1292
(W.D. Tex. 1989); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp.
984, 1008-09 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955
(1989); Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1295-96 (N.D. 111.
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 437-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-52 (Del. 1985);
Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977).
In the event a state prohibits "discrimination" among shareholders (i.e., all
shareholders must have the same voting rights), courts will enjoin the adoption and use
of a poison pill plan that discriminates among shareholders. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
235. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
236. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that nothing in record suggested that target board acted with
any other motive than to enhance bidding during the auction).
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sition and suggests that target boards should refrain from modifying or
adopting poison pill plans if Revlon has already been triggered.
Moreover, the Q VC decision may be construed as a warning that
poison pill plans cannot favor one bidder over another without courts
deeming them unreasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
The unlimited number of takeover defenses and the varying, court
reactions to such defenses have been a cause of great uncertainty for
corporate boards of directors. After the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in QVC, corporate directors should have an outline to follow
in deciding what actions to take to fend off hostile tender offers
without breaching any fiduciary duties to the corporation or share-
holders.
If the target corporation is not "up for sale" as defined by Revlon
and its progeny, the business judgment rule will protect a target
board's decision to implement takeover. However, if the target
corporation is "up for sale" as defined by Revlon and its progeny, a
target board's decision to implement takeover defenses will be subject
to enhanced scrutiny. Consequently, in determining whether to
implement takeover defenses, target boards should primarily
determined whether Revlon has been triggered, and then act
accordingly.
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